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Abstract 
In this paper, we firstly review and analyse the existing empirical studies on momentum and 
contrarian strategies in China. By accounting for differences in study design, we are able to 
identify common findings in a diverse and seemingly contradictory body of existing 
empirical evidence. Overall, in monthly returns there appear to exist medium- and longer-
term reversals in the pre-2001 period and short-term reversals and longer-term momentum 
effects thereafter. We further conduct an empirical analysis of monthly data on Chinese A 
shares, varying one factor in the research design at a time (sample period, equally- or value-
weighed portfolios, skipping a period between portfolio formation and holding periods, and 
exclusion of post-IPO observations). This allows us to pinpoint directly how each of these 
factors affects momentum profits and why studies using different designs might have arrived 
at different conclusions. We find substantial time-variation in profits to momentum strategies. 
Additionally, we observe small stocks to exhibit stronger reversals than their larger 
counterparts, a large fraction of portfolio returns to occur in the first month after formation, 
and evidence of post-IPO price drifts. Overall, this study reconciles and explains inconsistent 
evidence on the existence of momentum and contrarian effects in China. 
 
Keywords: Chinese stock market; Momentum; Return Reversals; Market Efficiency; 
Behavioural Finance. 
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The contribution of this paper is to enable solid conclusions to be drawn about the existence 
of momentum effects in China as the current evidence is unsatisfactory. We review and 
analyse the existing empirical studies on momentum and contrarian strategies in China and 
show that many of the findings in these studies appear inconsistent, if not actually 
contradictory.  To clarify this confused situation we initially identify common findings in the 
diverse and seemingly contradictory body of existing empirical evidence. Subsequently, we 
systematically assess how the design of empirical studies affects the results of investigations 
in this area. We do this by conducting an empirical analysis of monthly data on Chinese A 
shares, varying one factor in the research design at a time (sample period, equally or value-
weighed portfolios, skipping a period between portfolio formation and holding periods, and 
exclusion of post-IPO observations). This allows us to pinpoint directly how each of these 
factors affects momentum profits and thus when these profits are likely to be observed. It also 
indicates why studies using different designs might have arrived at seemingly inconsistent 
conclusions. Overall, we draw a number of conclusions: there appear to exist medium- and 
longer-term reversals in the pre-2001 period and short-term reversals and longer-term 
momentum effects thereafter; there is substantial time-variation in the profits to momentum 
strategies; small stocks exhibit stronger reversals than their larger counterparts; a large 
fraction of portfolio returns occur in the first month after formation; there is evidence of post-
IPO price drifts. In summary, this study reconciles and explains the inconsistent evidence on 
the existence of momentum and contrarian effects in China allowing clear conclusions to be 
drawn. 
 
Keywords: Chinese stock market; Momentum; Return Reversals; Market Efficiency; 
Behavioural Finance. 






Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) demonstrated that US stocks with higher past returns 
outperform stocks with lower past returns over a medium-term horizon, a phenomenon which 
they termed the momentum effect. Since being first reported, momentum effects have 
attracted a considerable amount of interest from academics and have proven to be rather 
persistent and challenging to explain, so much so that Fama (1998) concluded that 
momentum remains an “open puzzle”. The momentum effect is controversial as it contradicts 
one of the cornerstones of the modern finance theory, the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 
1970), which postulates that, in a weakly-efficient market, it should be impossible to 
systematically predict future price movements based on historical data.  
Numerous studies have demonstrated momentum to be a widespread phenomenon, 
which also exists in international stock markets (Park and Kim, 2014; Rouwenhorst, 1998) 
including emerging countries (Rouwenhorst, 1999), in worldwide markets (Bhojraj and 
Swaminathan, 2006), in a range of industries (Moskowitz and Grinblatt 1999), and also in 
commodities and currency markets (Erb and Harvey, 2006; Okunev and White, 2003). Based 
on a discussion of the opposite effect, the contrarian effect as unveiled by DeBondt and 
Thaler (1985), it could be questioned whether momentum effects in portfolio returns are 
indeed driven by autocorrelations in individual stocks’ returns, which could indicate market 
inefficiency, or merely due to existence of lead-lag effects or cross-sectional differences in 
mean returns (following a decomposition proposed by Lo and McKinley, 1990). The latter is 
a rational risk-based explanation and implies that momentum profits compensate for extra 
risk because winner stocks are more risky than loser stocks (e.g., Ahn et al., 2003; Bansal et 
al., 2005; Berk et al., 1999; Conrad and Kaul, 1998; Johnson, 2002; Liu and Zhang, 2008; 




macroeconomic risk can explain momentum and cast doubt on risk based explanations of 
momentum in general.   
Momentum profits have frequently been posited to result from investors’ irrational 
behaviour. For instance, Barberis et al. (1998) demonstrate that representativeness and 
conservatism biases can generate momentum effects; Daniel et al. (1998) explain momentum 
effects as a result of self-attribution and overconfidence biases among investors; Hong and 
Stein (1999) show momentum to arise from interactions among boundedly rational 
heterogeneous agents; and Grinblatt and Han (2002) attribute the existence of momentum to 
the disposition effect. Overall, as argued by Booth et al. (2016), rational explanations or firm 
characteristics do not fully reveal the reasons for the existence of momentum effects (e.g., 
Bandarchuk and Hilscher, 2013; Conrad and Kaul, 1998; Johnson, 2002; Sagi and Seasholes, 
2007), which also appears to exist after accounting for transaction costs (Korajczyk and 
Sadka, 2004; Lehmann, 1990; Lesmond et al., 2004). These authors argue that evidence on 
over/underreaction in asset prices (Antoniou et al., 2013; Barberis et al., 1998; Chan et al., 
1996; Daniel et al., 1998; De Bondt and Thaler, 1985, 1987; Frazzini, 2006; Grinblatt and 
Han, 2005; Hong et al., 2000; Hong and Stein, 1999) is more supportive of the irrationality-
based explanations of momentum.  
Given its almost universal nature and  investor irrationality as a likely reason for its 
existence, one would expect the momentum phenomenon to be especially strong and 
persistent in a market dominated by inexperienced, less than fully financially literate, 
predominantly individual investors who have preciously few alternative uses for their savings 
and where official gambling is strictly limited, potentially attracting stock market “investors” 
looking for the thrills of short term gains (and losses) rather than sound long-term investment 
opportunities1. An example of such an environment is the Chinese market for A-type stocks, 
                                                          




which was historically closed to foreign investors and which is still dominated by domestic 
individuals.2 However, empirical studies on China yield anything but a clear and consistent 
picture, with conflicting results regarding the existence and predominance of momentum vs. 
contrarian effects in stock prices. This weak and inconsistent result is a surprise given the 
abovementioned considerations and stands in contrast to that in other comparable emerging 
markets such as India where momentum effects are exhibited quite strongly (Narayan et al., 
2014; Narayan et al., 2017b).   The result could, however, be driven by the fact that existing 
studies on China are very heterogeneous in many respects, including the sample period 
investigated, data frequency, stock exchanges and stock types (A and B stocks) considered, 
portfolio formation methods, inclusion of post-IPO observations, and other filters employed 
on the data. Alternatively, it may be that the Chinese stock market is much less inefficient 
than one would expect a priori: in analogy to Fama’s (1998) argument that if “anomalies split 
randomly between underreaction and overreaction, they are consistent with market 
efficiency”, one could argue that a split of results between momentum and contrarian (and 
none) effects in China could indicate that market’s efficiency. 
The contribution of this paper is to enable solid conclusions to be drawn about the 
existence of momentum effects in China which is currently not possible given the 
unsatisfactory existing evidence.  To clarify this confused situation, we firstly review and 
analyse the existing empirical studies on momentum and contrarian strategies in China. We 
contribute to the literature by identifying common findings in this diverse and seemingly 
contradictory body of evidence.   We show that, when monthly returns are considered, there 
appear to exist medium- and longer-term reversals in the pre-2001 period and short-term 
reversals and longer-term momentum effects thereafter.  
                                                          
2 Reforms in 2001 (2002) relaxed restrictions for some domestic (foreign) investors to trade in B-type (A-type) 
stocks (Gebka, 2009), but trading in A-type (B-type) shares is still dominated by domestic (foreign) investors. 
Ng and Wu (2007) demonstrate the existence of behavioural patterns in trading by Chinese individual investors, 





Subsequently, we systematically assess how the design of empirical studies affects the 
results of investigations in this area. We also see that study design features such as data 
frequency, the stock exchanges and stock types (A and B stocks) considered, portfolio 
formation methods, inclusion of post-IPO observations, and other filters employed on the 
data also appear to affect the results. However, as prior studies differ in more than one 
respect, it is not possible to perfectly disentangle the effects of all those factors and to 
precisely identify how each of them affects momentum/contrarian profits.  
This takes us to the second, empirical part of this paper, which is to empirically 
investigate how changes in each individual aspect of research studies (sample period, 
equally- or value-weighed portfolios, skipping a period between portfolio formation and 
holding periods, and an exclusion of post-IPO observations) affects momentum/contrarian 
profits. The subsample analysis confirms our conclusions from the literature analysis about 
the time-varying nature of momentum returns. Further results indicate that specific features 
of study design in momentum studies frequently do matter, as we find, e.g., small stocks to 
exhibit stronger reversals than their larger counterparts, a large fraction of portfolio returns to 
be driven by returns in the first month after formation, and evidence of post-IPO price drifts. 
Our empirical results for different combinations of those study design features mostly 
correspond with those reported in the relevant and comparable existing studies, indicating 
that the inconsistency in the momentum/reversal results reported in the literature is largely 
driven by differences in the methods applied, rather than them being a statistical artefact 
resulting from the Chinese market being free of the inefficiencies those strategies are 
designed to exploit. 
 
2. Literature review 




The literature on momentum in China adopts a variety of approaches, rendering the resulting 
findings difficult to compare. These studies differ in terms of the sample period investigated, 
data frequency, the stock exchanges and stock types (A and B stocks) considered, either 
jointly or separately where applicable, the stated methodology, portfolio formation methods 
and horizons, inclusion of post-IPO data, and other filters employed on the data. Table 1 
summarises the relevant literature3. 
Most papers analyse the early period of the Chinese stock market history, defined here 
as ending around year 2001: from 14 papers reviewed here, seven investigate exclusively this 
early sample period, while another two (Pan et al., 2013; Zhou et al., 2010) analyse the early 
period as one of their subsamples. In contrast, only two papers (same as cited above) report 
results on the profitability of momentum strategies in China in the immediate post-2001 era, 
with another two (Cheema and Nartea, 2014, Chen et al., 2015) analysing late sub-periods 
starting in 2007/8. In addition, only seven papers provide evidence on a longer period, 
encompassing the 1990s and the post-2000 era. Hence, the evidence on the pre-2001 period is 
much richer than for the whole and especially for the post-2001 period. If momentum/ 
contrarian profits are largely time-invariant, one would be justified in relying on those studies 
utilising longer sample periods; if, however, momentum profits vary over time, a more likely 
scenario, an approach using sub-samples or a more sophisticated analysis allowing for this 
time variation in returns would be preferred. 
 Most studies employ data with monthly frequency, in line with seminal papers by De 
Bond and Thaler (1985) on contrarian strategies and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) on 
momentum strategies. Whereas 12 papers provide evidence on momentum profits using 
monthly data, with three among them conducting analysis on weekly and monthly data 
                                                          
3 Given the methodology of our analysis we have concentrated on studies using only Chinese stocks but for 
completeness we mention that some recent studies have included some Chinese stocks in studies of momentum 
amongst much larger sets of stocks (Narayan, 2017; Narayan et al., 2017a).  Another interesting study looks at 
the relationship between technology investment and stock market momentum in 77 countries.  China is 




separately (Chen et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2015; Pan et al., 2013), only one study (Wu, 2011) 
uses daily and one exclusively weekly (Kang et al., 2002) observations. The underlying 
assumption appears to be that momentum and/or contrarian effects are of a sufficiently long-
term character to be captured by monthly data. In addition, the most common choice appears 
to be to investigate jointly A-type stocks listed on both the Shanghai (SHSE) and Shenzhen 
(SZSE) stock exchanges, although some studies provide results separately for SHSE and 
SZSE (Wu, 2011, Wang and Chin, 2004), investigate the Shanghai exchange only (Cheema 
and Nartea, 2014; Naughton et al., 2008), or provide evidence for B-type stocks as well 
(Zhou et al., 2010). Some studies are not explicit as to which exchange was considered 
(Griffin et al., 2003, Gupta et al., 2010). Separating A and B shares is largely justified as, 
firstly, effectively only A shares are available to the domestic investors, whereas foreign 
investors trade almost exclusively in B shares, hence these two share types are not 
substitutable and in reality only A shares can be thought of as the Chinese domestic market; 
secondly, trading in B shares is only a small fraction of that in A shares; and thirdly, several 
firms issued both A and B shares, hence, analysing them jointly can create problems of 
double-counting firms, etc. Separating the SHSE from the SZSE could be justified based on 
the fact that firms listed on the SZSE have different characteristics (are on average smaller, 
are not former State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), are in specific industries etc.), however, 
leaving out one of these locations would miss out a substantial part of the Chinese market, as 
the markets are comparable in size. In addition, one can control for firm characteristics in a 
more formal and efficient way than by splitting SHSE - from SZSE-listed firms, for instance 
by splitting all stocks (SHSE and SHSE) into subgroups according to the preferred features 
(size, industry, ownership structure, etc.). 
 There are several methodological variations present in the literature on momentum in 




for the portfolio formation method. Identification of a winner and a loser portfolio appears to 
vary substantially, the most common approach being to form five equally-sized portfolios 
(seven studies), with further four studies forming ten portfolios, and the remaining studies 
adopting still different approaches. The number of portfolios is clearly important as a higher 
number of portfolios implies that the highest (winner) and the lowest (loser) one will contain 
more extreme observations/stocks, but fewer of them. Hence, a higher number of portfolios 
will tend to result in more pronounced results if the momentum or contrarian strategy works 
(see, e.g., Gupta et al., 2013, for international, including Chinese, evidence), but returns on 
small portfolios will be measured with a lower level of efficiency and those portfolios will be 
more likely affected by idiosyncratic risk. Furthermore, most studies (11) investigate equally-
weighted (EW) portfolios, whereas only a few also analyse value-weighted (VW) portfolios 
which minimise the potential bias on portfolio returns induced by the presence of numerous 
but small stocks.  
 Empirical studies further differ in relation to the length of the portfolio formation (J) 
and holding (K) periods. A formation period of up to 6 months is employed in six studies 
whereas a period of up to 12 months has been adopted in another five studies. The shortest 
maximum formation period is one week (five studies), and the longest is 36 months (Zhou et 
al., 2010). As for the holding period K, six months is adopted as the maximum length in five 
studies and extended to up to 12 months in another six studies; overall, holding periods range 
from one day (Wu, 2011) to 48 months (Naughton et al., 2008). Clearly, this heterogeneity in 
holding and formation period lengths renders many results difficult to compare and should be 
expected to generate a mix of conclusions regarding the existence of momentum and reversal 
effects in stock prices in China. For instance, the choice of a formation period can affect 
whether a transitory or a more persistent trend in prices is being detected, with consequences 




the holding period will affect the final findings, as certain effects (continuations or reversals) 
may only be observable over sufficiently short or long horizons, but optimal lengths of those 
horizons are not known a priori.  
 The literature on momentum/reversal has long recognised that empirical results can be 
affected by the bid-ask spread, price pressure, and lagged price reactions (Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993). Hence, it recommends leaving a time gap between the end of the formation 
and the start of the holding period. Again, studies on the Chinese market largely vary in the 
extent to which this recommendation is implemented. The most popular approach is to skip 
one month (eight papers), but five of the reviewed papers do not leave out any gap between 
formation and holding periods. Kang et al. (2002) skip one day, and Chen et al. (2012) skip 
one week as a robustness check for weekly data. Cheema and Nartea (2014) skip one period 
(a week or a month) of the formation period. As issues of bid-ask spread, price pressure, and 
lagged price reactions can affect Chinese stocks to a considerable extent, skipping would 
appear advisable; however, skipping as much as one month could result in the analysis failing 
to capture short term price effects, a phenomenon likely to be of relevance in such a volatile 
market where many individual, inexperienced traders may suffer from psychological biases 
and are likely driven by short-term profit and loss considerations. It might be impossible to 
determine a priori an optimal skipping period, hence caution should be taken when 
interpreting empirical results, especially where no robustness checks, as is the case with most 
of the literature here, have been conducted on the impact of the skipping period length. 
 Yet another feature of the Chinese stock market is that IPOs are typically extremely 
underpriced (e.g., Su and Brookfield, 2013), resulting in substantial post-IPO price drifts. 
Hence, to avoid an apparent overestimation of returns for those portfolios which contain 
newly listed stocks, several studies advocate excluding a certain number of post-IPO 




price observations after an IPO, with another one (Kang et al., 2002) excluding one week of 
such data. On the other hand, three studies appear to include all post-IPO prices, with another 
six remaining silent on their treatment of this issue. Whether one agrees with post-IPO 
exclusion or not (after all, an investor following a momentum or contrarian strategy would 
have the opportunity to invest in newly listed firms as much as in those established ones, 
potentially benefiting from the initial price drift), the approach varies across papers and could 
generate substantial differences in returns. 
 In addition, the reviewed studies also differ in a number of other filters which are 
being applied to the data. For instance, several papers explicitly state that certain types of 
securities, such as banks, closed-end funds, real estate companies, investment companies, 
ADRs, etc., have been excluded from their analysis (Cheema and Nartea, 2014; Griffin et al., 
2008; Gupta et al., 2010, 2013; Wang, 2004; Wang and Chin, 2004; Zhou et al., 2010). 
Others include all securities, while some papers exclude stocks first listed in the later part of 
their sample (Kang et al., 2002), first form portfolios after a third of their sample time has 
passed (Wu, 2011), exclude those stocks whose prices hit the 10% limit in the previous 
trading day (Pan et al., 2013), exclude “penny stocks” (Cheema and Nartea, 2014), or impose 
a minimum number of observations in the formation period for a security to be included (Li 
et al., 2010). Furthermore, most studies remain silent on whether they account for the 
potential survivorship bias by including delisted stocks, with some exceptions (e.g., Griffin et 
al., 2003, Gupta et al, 2010, 2013). Needless to say, variations across studies in terms of 
survivorship bias and of the types of securities included in the analysis make direct 
comparisons of their results rather difficult. 
2.2. Comparison of results 
As momentum effects could vary over time, our first aspect of analysis is the sample period 




modern history, from its inception in 1990-1 to around year 2001. To start with, analysing 
monthly returns is the most popular approach. Most studies in this category report significant 
reversals in prices, mostly in the medium and longer term (Griffin et al., 2003, except for the 
first 6 months of the holding period; Wang, 2004; Wang and Chin, 2004, for high-volume 
portfolios only; Zhou et al, 2010). Contrary to these studies, Pan et al. (2013) finds no 
significant effects, however, this study differs from those cited above in that it does not 
exclude a one-month skipping period. On the other hand, Gupta et al. (2010, 2013) report 
significant price continuations, except in small stocks where they find reversals; their sample 
period, however, is much shorter than those of the other papers and ends in 1997. These 
authors also do not specify which share type(s) and stock exchange is considered, and stock 
prices are in USD rather than in the local currency. Therefore, the difference in results could 
be revealing the prevalence of momentum effects in the very early years of the Chinese stock 
market or be driven by the currency market or a particular stock type or exchange. As for 
higher frequency returns, Kang et al. (2002) uses weekly data and finds short term contrarian 
(up to 12-16 weeks) but medium-term momentum (16-26 weeks) profits, but these results are 
not supported for weekly data by those obtained by Pan et al. (2013) who only find 
momentum for J, K of 2-3 weeks4 and reversals for the 1-1 week strategy, maybe because 
post-IPO prices are excluded for six months from their study, compared to just a one week 
exclusion in Kang et al. (2002). This could indicate that short-term price trends following 
IPOs are a significant driver of momentum/reversal effects. Wu (2011) employs daily data 
while not excluding post-IPO observations and reports contrarian effects lasting between one 
day and one week, but momentum effects for 9-12 months holding periods for SHSE stocks 
only. This indicates that the post-IPO price drift may be an important factor behind medium-
                                                          
4 In this paper we adopt the notation that J represents the past period used to form portfolios and K the 




term momentum effects. Overall, however, most studies on the pre-2001 period use monthly 
data and find significant reversals in prices in the medium and longer term. 
 In contrast to the first decade of stock market development in China, only two papers 
(Pan et al, 2013; Zhou et al, 2010) analyse the profitability of momentum strategies in the 
post-2001 era, however, their samples end in 2008 and 2009, respectively. Both find 
significant reversals for up to 6 months, although Zhou et al. (2010), who allow for much 
longer holding periods, report significant momentum profits in the longer run (18-36 months 
holding periods for A shares and 9-36 months for B shares). Short time reversals and long 
term momentum are rather at odds with what the literature reported for the pre-2001 period, 
as reviewed above.  
 In addition, two recent papers analyse momentum profits since the outbreak of the 
2007-8 financial crisis. Cheema and Nartea (2014) investigate the 2007-13 subperiod and 
Chen et al. (2015) examine the 2008-13 subperiod. For monthly data, the former paper 
reports significant reversals up to K=12, but the latter finds returns to be insignificant. 
However, Chen et al. (2015) find significant reversals in weekly data, for horizons up to three 
weeks.  
 Lastly, several studies conduct their analysis on longer sample periods, which include 
observations from the pre- and post-2001 subsamples. Given our conclusion above that these 
periods show contrasting results when it comes to the prevalence of momentum and reversal 
effects, one can anticipate that studies incorporating both sub-periods to a varying extent will 
vary with respect of their overall findings, depending on how much of the pre- vs post-2001 
data has been utilised. This is indeed what we find: whereas Naughton et al. (2008) report a 
pronounced pattern of momentum effects over a wide range of formation and holding periods 
of 1 to 48 months, and Cheema and Nartea (2014) find significant momentum effects up to 




periods from 3 to 36 months. Chen et al. (2012) and Pan et al. (2013) find only a few 
incidents of rather short–term (generally, 1-3 months) reversals in weekly and monthly data 
(as do Chen et al., 2015, for weekly data). In contrast, Li et al. (2010) finds no significant 
effects when using non-risk-adjusted returns, but short-term reversals for CAPM-adjusted 
returns, and Chen et al. (2015) do not find any significant momentum effects in monthly data 
up to 12 months of the holding period. Pan et al. (2013) further add to the confusion by 
reporting that, when the interval ranking method is used to identify past winners and losers, 
numerous instances of significant momentum profits can be found in up to 52 weeks of the 
holding period.  
 Overall, the available body of empirical evidence on China provides mixed results, 
but some conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the sample period investigated appears to be 
important, as in the first decade of modern Chinese stock market history significant reversals 
in prices in mostly medium and longer-term were found. In contrast, post-2001 studies, albeit 
less numerous, indicate the opposite result, i.e., shorter-term reversals and longer-term 
momentum effects (although the latter might have disappeared following the outbreak of the 
2007-8 financial crisis). Secondly, features such as data frequency, the stock exchanges and 
stock types (A and B stocks) considered, portfolio formation methods, the inclusion of post-
IPO observations, and other filters employed on the data appear to affect the results as well. 
However, precise statements as to how exactly the momentum/contrarian profits are affected 
by each of these features separately are not possible, as studies typically differ in more than 
one respect, rendering direct comparison difficult if not impossible.  
3. Data and Methodology 
For our empirical investigation, monthly data of A-shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) is collected from DataStream for the 




recent observations are not included as this period is not analysed in the reviewed literature, 
hence its inclusion would impede comparability of results. The data type used is the total 
return index of the last available trading day in each month. Monthly data is the frequency 
used most often in the momentum literature on Chinese and other markets, hence using 
monthly data makes our results more comparable with those reported in the existing 
literature. Another reason for using monthly data is that higher frequency data is likely to 
include more noise, and more frequent trading resulting from the use of weekly data means 
much higher transaction costs than those generated by a monthly trading strategy. 
 The method used to compute returns from each momentum portfolio is broadly based 
on that of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). In each month, sample securities are ranked in 
ascending order by their past J-month (J=1, 2, 3…, 24) accumulated returns, and divided into 
five groups according to the quintile return values. This is a slight deviation from Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) as these authors form decile portfolios. However, most of the research on 
the Chinese stock market uses the quintile method, hence we employ the same approach to 
insure the comparability of our findings. Secondly, especially before 1995, the number of 
total listed stocks is small, hence forming decile portfolios would result in each containing 
too few stocks. After ranking stocks based on the past J-month cumulated returns and 
dividing them into quintile portfolios, stocks are held for a period of K months (K=1, 2, 3, …, 
24) in each strategy, which results in 576 strategies in total. The portfolio with the highest 
past returns during the formation period J is called the ‘winner’ portfolio and the one with 
lowest returns is called the ‘loser’ portfolio. Zero-cost momentum portfolios are then created 
by going long in the winner portfolio and shorting the loser portfolio.  
This procedure is repeated every month, hence, in any given month t, the momentum 
strategy as a whole holds a series of portfolios which were selected in the current month and 




attaching equal weights to stocks in each quantile portfolio at formation time. A value-
weighted strategy attaches weights to securities based on their market value as compared to 
the total market value in the respective quintile portfolio (to ensure that weights add up to 
one).  
4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
4.1. The whole sample period: 1991 to 2012 
For equally-weighted strategies, we find significant evidence of mean reversals in the 
Chinese stock market between 1991 and 2012 (Table 2 reports detailed results on monthly 
returns whereas Figures 1 and 3 summarise their relevant features). Returns to all but one of 
the equally-weighted strategies are negative, which suggests that past losers outperformed 
past winners over time, regardless of the formation and holding period length. Within all 576 
equally-weighted strategies, 318 yield statistically significant negative profits at a 
significance level of at least 10%. Firstly, shown in the top left corner of Figure 1, there are a 
few profitable strategies for short formation and holding periods, generally for J, K=1 to 6, 
with the one-month formation strategy also yielding positive contrarian profits for longer 
holding periods (K up to 8 months as well as between 15 and 24 months). Secondly, for 
strategies with longer formation and holding periods (J, K over 12 months, located in the 
bottom right part of Figure 1), almost all profits are significant and negative. In addition, 
significant contrarian profits are also observed for strategies with shorter formation periods (J 
between 6 and 12 months) when the corresponding holding periods are long (K from 13 to 
24) and J+K is at least 24, as well for numerous strategies with a long formation period of 
more than 12 months and a shorter holding period of up to 12 months. These findings 
highlight the necessity of investigating longer formation and holding period: 11 out of 14 
studies reviewed here limit their holding periods to 12 months or less, hence failing to 




 As for the magnitudes of these profits, Figure 3 (where the negatives of the obtained 
returns, annualised and in percentage points, are presented for ease of exposition) reveals that 
contrarian profits are the highest for very short holding and formation periods, they decrease 
gradually as J and K increase, but start raising again when formation and holding periods are 
at around 12 months. Lastly, there is a slight dip in profitability as one moves to the most 
lengthy formation and holding combinations (towards J, K=24). The strongest (annualised) 
return is recorded for the 2-1 contrarian strategy, of 18.11%, while the lowest contrarian 
profit (which is the only incidence of price momentum rather than reversal here) is a negative 
2.39% for the 7-6 strategy. The average reversal return across all 576 strategies is 5.97%, 
with strategies based on longer formation periods J earning up to almost four times as much 
as those based on shorter formation periods (on average, regardless of holding period K). On 
the other hand, contrarian profits are not overly sensitive to the choice of the holding period 
K, with a noticeable exception of those strategies using very short (K=1 or 2) holding 
periods. In fact, strategies with K=1 earn on average the most, 10.55%, and only one (for 
J=12) performs worse than the average across all combinations of J and K.  
 Next, returns to value-weighted strategies are estimated (results reported in Table 3 
and depicted in Figures 2 and 4). A value-weighted strategy reduces the emphasis on small 
stocks.  To the extent that the prices of small stocks are likely to be less efficient than those of 
large stocks5 this strategy is likely to reduce departures from an efficient market (i.e. the 
likelihood of contrarian or momentum profits).  The extensive contrarian profits found in 
equally-weighted strategies largely disappear when portfolios are composed by weighting 
based on the market value of each stock: the number of significant returns is reduced from 
318 to 74 out of 576 strategies. In addition, most of the significant results are only significant 
at the 10% rather than the 5% level. These findings are broadly in line with what one would 
                                                          
5 Small stock prices are likely to be less efficient for a variety of reasons including greater trading costs, lower 




expect theoretically.  However, the general pattern of contrarian profits remains similar to 
that observed among the equally-weighted strategies: profitable contrarian strategies are 
observed in the top left and the bottom right corners (Figure 2). For short formation periods 
contrarian strategies only make profits when the formation period is no longer than three and 
the holding period is no longer than two months, and for formation period longer than 14 
months contrarian strategies only yield profits when the holding period is longer than 12 
months.6 Performance also slumps for the longest formation and holding periods. The 
magnitude of those contrarian profits, tend to be lower on average (3.67%, compared to 
5.97% for equally-weighted portfolios). As a result, there are more instances of negative 
contrarian (positive momentum) profits: 91 out of 576, as compared to just one for equally-
weighted portfolios. Portfolios with long formation periods J still perform better than their 
short formation period counterparts, with this difference being more pronounced than in case 
of equal weighting. However, longer holding periods also appear to yield higher (double the 
size) contrarian profits than shorter ones, but strategies with holding periods of K=1 month 
still outperform other options, on average: they yield annualised 6.54% on average, with the 
highest returns of 13.46% for J=2. Overall, however, the pattern of profitability is very 
similar to that for equally-weighted portfolios, with contrarian profits being the highest for 
very short holding and formation periods, decreasing gradually as J and K increase, starting 
to raise again when formation and holding periods are at around 12 months, and with a slight 
dip in profitability as one moves to the most lengthy formation and holding combinations 
(towards J, K=24). 
4.2. Subsample Analysis 
In order to analyse the potentially time-varying nature of momentum/contrarian effects, the 
sample period has been divided into five sub-periods: 1993-1996, 1997-2000, 2001-2004, 
                                                          




2005-2008, and 2009-20127. In each sub-period, momentum strategies of buying past winners 
and selling past losers have also been implemented for up to 12-12 months as to ensure that 
enough observations were available in each strategy within each now relatively short five-
years sub-period, we did not test strategies longer than 12-12 months. In each sub-period 
there were 144 portfolios for equally-weighted and value-weighted strategies, respectively, 
which generated 1440 portfolios in total. For each return, firstly a standard t-test was applied 
to test whether results were statistically significant; additionally, to deal with the potential 
small sample issue, non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank tests were employed. We also 
tested whether the return of each strategy in a single sub-period is significantly different from 
the corresponding strategy in the whole sample period, again using both a t-test and a 
nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
 There are not strong theoretical grounds to expect specific patterns of returns among 
the different sub-periods.  If the market was uniformly efficient both momentum and reversal 
effects would be insignificant in all periods.  One might possible see a move to greater 
efficiency over time as the market developed.  Alternatively, changing but not necessarily 
increasing levels of efficiency would be consistent with the adaptive market hypothesis (Lo, 
2004).  The results for the sub-period equally-weighted momentum strategies from 1993 to 
2012 can be summarized as follows.8 None of the strategies in the sub-period 1993 to 1996 is 
significant, and for the sub-period 1997 to 2000, only two strategies out of 144 are significant 
when using the parametric t-test (none and 18, respectively, when applying the non-
parametric test). However, when we examine sub-periods 2005 to 2008 and 2009 to 2012, 
there are multiple significant and negative returns from momentum strategies: 41 significant 
negative returns in the former and 21 in the later sub-period (47 and 21, respectively, when 
applying the non-parametric test). For comparison, for the whole sample period we found 18 
                                                          
7 The reason for the beginning of the period being 1993 rather than 1991 is that two years of data are used for 
sorting the stocks. 




(out of 144) strategies to yield significant negative returns. These findings suggest that 
contrarian profits observed in the whole sample period are mostly driven by results in sub-
periods 2005-2008 and 2009-2012. Another interesting finding is that for the sub-period 2001 
to 2004, most of the significant strategies yield positive returns (in 48 cases, whereas in two 
cases significant profits are negative).  Using non-parametric tests yields a similar number of 
significant cases (40). Hence, the 2001-2004 sub-period is the only time when momentum 
strategy appears to generate significant positive profits in China.9 
In summary, in sub-sample periods of 2005-2008 and 2009-2012 momentum 
strategies generated negative returns, indicating that momentum effects do not exist in these 
two sub-periods, but contrarian trading can yield significant profits. When looking at the 
equally-weighted strategies, significant contrarian returns usually appear in holding periods 
of up to 10 months when the formation period is of one month. When the formation period 
becomes longer, the persistency of profits declines (fewer post-formation months with 
significant returns), and when it is longer than 4 months, contrarian profits only exist when 
holding periods are no longer than 3 months. For the sub-sample period of 2001-2004, 
significant momentum usually occurs when formation periods are longer than three months, 
and for holding periods near 12 months (6-12 months for most strategies); thus, longer-term 
momentum exists for the sub-sample period of 2001-2004. These findings correspond well 
with our analysis of the literature where short term reversals and longer term momentum 
effects were reported post-2001.  On theoretical grounds our results seem most in accord with 
the Adaptive Market Hypothesis (Lo, 2004). 
 In addition, value-weighted strategies in each sub-sample period have been tested. In 
general, the main findings still hold when portfolio weights are adjusted by market value. 
                                                          
9 The difference in pre- vs. post-2001 results corresponds well with stock market reforms in years 2001-2 which 
allowed trading by some domestic (foreign) investors in B (A) shares and have been demonstrated elsewhere to 
have an effect on the way the Chinese stock markets operate (e.g., Gebka, 2009). The end of this period is 
demarcated by the implementation of the split share market reform in 2005, which allowed previously non-




Returns in sub-periods 1993 to 1996 and 1997 to 2000 are similar to those shown for equally-
weighted strategies: we find one strategy to be significant in the first sub-period (as compared 
to none for equally-weighted portfolios), and no significant results for the second sub-period 
(two for equally-weighted portfolios). However, for the sub-sample 2001 to 2004, there are 
100 momentum strategies making significantly positive returns for value-weighted strategies 
(89 when a non-parametric test is used), around double as many as for equally-weighted 
portfolios. This suggests that momentum profits in the period 2001-2004 were driven to a 
large extent by large stocks. For sub-sample periods 2005 to 2008 and 2009 to 2012, we 
observe 43 and seven strategies which yield negative returns for value-weighted portfolios, 
respectively (35 and six when non-parametric tests are used), figures which are comparable to 
those obtained for equally-weighted portfolios. Hence, the contrarian profits in the later era of 
the Chinese market history do not seem to be mostly driven by stocks of any particular size. 
Compared to equally-weighted portfolios, post-2004 contrarian profits also seem to be short-
lived, especially for strategies with longer formation periods, while the 2001-2004 
momentum profits are also predominant for longer holding periods, especially when 
formation periods are short. 
In summary, the results of both equal-weighted and value-weighted momentum 
strategies suggest that for the sub-sample 2001-2004, momentum exists in the Chinese stock 
market, while for the 2005-2008 and 2009-2012 sub-sample, contrarian effects exist. For the 
early stages of Chinese market development (1993-2000), no significant results were found.  
Our findings of no significant returns before 2001 are in line with the study of Pan et 
al. (2013) which also finds no significant effects. Our methodology is quite comparable to 
that study in that both use monthly returns and do not exclude a one-month skipping period. 
However, other papers on the early period which skip one month after formation report 




except for the first 6 months of the holding period; Wang, 2004; Wang and Chin, 2004, for 
high-volume portfolios only; Zhou et al., 2010). In addition, our results are in contrast to 
Gupta et al. (2010, 2013) who skip one month after formation and, for the period 1993-97, 
report significant price continuations, except in small stocks where they find reversals (for the 
J, K=6m strategy). That study, however, does not specify which stock type and exchange is 
considered, and stock prices are in USD rather than in the local currency. Our findings of no 
effects before 2001 and momentum effects in the 2001-4 period are also in line with those in 
Naughton et al. (2008). They used data from 1995-2005 and found momentum for the 
strategies they tested. Thus, momentum found by Naughton et al. (2008) could be driven by 
the sub-sample of 2001-2004.  
Two papers (Pan et al, 2013; Zhou et al, 2010) analyse the profitability of momentum 
strategies in the post-2001 era. Both find significant reversals for up to 6 months, which is in 
line with our findings for the 2005-2008 and 2009-2012 sub-periods. Pan et al. (2013) reports 
short-term effects in the 2002-2009 era. Zhou et al. (2010), who analyse the period from 
March 2001 to June 2008 and allow for much longer holding periods, report significant 
reversals for J=K=6 months, but find momentum profits in the longer run (18-36 months 
holding periods for A shares and 9-36 months for B shares). Those findings are in line with 
our results. 
Why would year 2001 demarcate a structural change in momentum profits in China? 
We firstly notice that there was a series of institutional reforms implemented during that time 
which would have affected the working of the Chinese economy and its stock markets. For 
instance, as noted in footnote 9, stock market reforms in years 2001-2 allowed trading by 
some domestic (foreign) investors in B (A) shares and have been demonstrated elsewhere to 
have an effect on the way the Chinese stock markets operate (e.g., Gebka, 2009). In addition, 




or underwent other restructuring measures (corporatization, bankruptcy, mergers), resulting 
in a rapid decline of SOE numbers (by over 42%) between 2001 and 2004 (Brandt et al., 
2008). Furthermore, on 11 December 2001 China became a member of the WTO, which 
resulted in reductions in trade and investment barriers and would have increased competitive 
pressure on Chinese companies. 
Secondly, when we look at the aggregate stock market characteristics, the sub-period 
starting in 2001 appears to have unique empirical features.10 To start with, the Chinese stock 
market peaked around the end of 2000 (both the price and the return index show this 
characteristic), in line with the worldwide trend driven by the dotcom bubble and its 
subsequent collapse. Turnover, both by value and volume, started an exponential rise around 
the year 2001 as well, and the total market capitalisation also increased dramatically around 
that date, and its subsequent growth has been much faster than in the pre-2001 period. A 
similar change in the trend behaviour of the dividend yield can also be observed around 2001. 
In addition, market-wide measures of aggregate profitability, such as EBITDA and 
shareholder equity, also experienced a dramatic change in trend behaviour from 2001 
onwards, which was not entirely due to just bigger companies being listed, on average, as the 
return on equity (ROE) also experienced a change in behaviour towards an upward trend 
during the same time.  
Given the range and heterogeneity of these changes, it may not possible to derive a 
precise prediction of how momentum profits would have been affected by these changes, 
however, our result of a structural break in momentum profits in year 2001 corresponds well 
with the preponderance of economic and financial reforms and with changes in aggregate 
financial data during that time. 
                                                          
10 We employed the Datastream’s China A stock market index to represent the Chinese stock market, in a 
window of time containing 5 years of monthly observations before and after the start of 2001 (results not 




4.3. Effects of Study Design on Results 
Our sample consists of A-type equities and we initially did not skip any days between 
portfolio formation and holding periods, nor did we exclude post-IPO data. In theoretical 
terms, skipping days would reduce any market microstructure effects in the data.  It would 
also, however, reduce any of the effects of interest (momentum or reversals) that were 
exhibited shortly after the formation of portfolios.  It is not altogether clear what one would 
expect the overall effect of skipping days to be.  In China IPOs have generally tended to be 
very undervalued with stocks having an IPO tending to drift upwards after the IPO date.  
Thus excluding IPOs would tend to reduce momentum effects although not necessarily to a 
large extent as stocks from IPOs would not form a substantial proportion of the overall 
portfolio.  As studies on Chinese markets differ in respect of data selection and study design, 
leading to heterogeneous findings, we are interested in how these differences in approach 
affect findings on momentum effects. Firstly, we observe that Chen et al. (2012) and Pan et 
al. (2013) investigate a similar time period, between 1995 and 2009, and the study of Zhou et 
al. (2010) is also similar in analysing data from the 1993-2008 period. Hence, differences in 
these studies’ reported outcomes could be deduced to be due to differences in their study 
design. We restrict our sample to 1995-2009 and compare the resulting four sets of findings.11 
Firstly, when the whole 1995-2009 period is considered, all three of the aforementioned 
studies find significant reversals for short formation and holding periods, which is similar to 
our findings (although we also find significant reversals for longer formation periods). This 
similarity is observed despite the fact that these studies use different portfolio formation 
approaches, some (Chen et al., 2012, and our study) do not exclude post-IPOs data and do not 
skip one month between formation and holding, and impose other heterogeneous filters on 
inclusion of stocks into the sample. Hence, these short term reversals appear to be rather 
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robust and not driven by IPOs, returns in the first month after portfolio formation, or specific 
stocks.  These findings are not inconsistent with what one would expect on theoretical 
grounds.  
 Secondly, when we compare the results in the sub-periods pre- and post- 2001, with 
those of Pan et al. (2013), the results are qualitatively identical: there are no significant 
profits in the earlier sub-period but significant reversals for shorter formation and holding 
periods in the 2002-2009 era. This is in line with our sub-period analysis described in the 
previous subsection and indicates that momentum from 2001-4 was dominated by subsequent 
return reversals in the sample. As Pan et al. (2013) excluded post-IPO data and stocks which 
hit the 10% regulatory price limit, and we did not, our approaches were slightly different, and 
yet the results are in line with each other. Again, this suggests robustness of the finding that 
contrarian effects in China do not appear to be driven by post-IPO anomalies and extreme 
movements in individual stocks.  
 Thirdly, we investigate whether those profits are driven by stocks of a particular size 
by comparing results from equally-weighted and value-weighted strategies for our sample in 
the 1995-2009 period. Here, we observe fewer and lower significant negative returns for the 
value-weighted strategy, similarly to the full sample results (1993-2012), suggesting that 
return reversals are concentrated in smaller stocks, and this effect is not confined to the early 
(1993-1994) or late (2010-12) sub-periods.  
 Lastly, as comparisons across diverse studies, as above, have the disadvantage of not 
being able to examine only one feature of the study design at a time, we amend our 1995-
2009 sample in two ways. Firstly, we keep everything as in the initial approach but exclude 
the first (post-IPO) six months of data for all affected stocks. The results, as compared with 
the baseline scenario, are not dramatically different, as the observed significant return 




returns computed under exclusion of post-IPO data show slightly stronger reversal patterns. 
This suggests that there is some price drift following the first listing of companies in China. 
Secondly, allowing for one month of inactivity between the end of the formation period and 
the start of the holding period does seem to have weakened return reversals considerably, 
with almost all but one result becoming insignificant. In contrast, Zhou et al (2010) did find 
some short term reversals even when skipping one month, however, their study differs from 
ours in other respects as well, e.g., by excluding stocks from certain industries and in the way 
momentum portfolios are formed. Hence, return reversals can be mostly confined to the 
period immediately following portfolio formation unless one employs alternative methods of 
portfolio formation or focuses on specific industries.  
5. Summary and Conclusions 
In this study, we thoroughly analyse the existing empirical literature on momentum effects in 
China as well as conduct a comprehensive empirical analysis of that stock market. Our 
contribution is to enable solid conclusions to be drawn about the existence of momentum 
effects in China. Our motivation stems from the observation that there seems to be 
disagreement between previous empirical studies of the existence of momentum effects in 
China.   In addition, a substantial body of theoretical and empirical literature indicates that 
momentum effects are driven by the irrationality of investors. One would expect these effects 
should be very pronounced in Chinese A-type shares, as the bulk of their trading volume is 
generated by local individual investors who would be more prone to behavioural biases and 
irrational decision making than their more sophisticated institutional, especially overseas, 
counterparts. However, the literature on momentum in China reports empirical results which 
do not support this expectation. As discussed above, different studies report contradicting 




effects. Therefore, we set on to investigate why the existing literature fails to give a clear 
picture of momentum in China.  
 Firstly, we analyse the existing empirical evidence and attempt to disentangle 
different study design features which vary across the literature and could be generating the 
observed inconsistencies in results. We are able to observe that the sample period varies 
across studies, and those investigating monthly data in the pre-2001 period tend to find 
medium and long term reversals, whereas studies which analyse the subsequent period 
typically report short-term reversals and long term momentum. Hence, some systematic 
patterns can be observed when one accounts for the sample period analysed. However, 
empirical studies differ in more than one respect, with other features being data frequency, 
the stock exchanges and stock types considered, portfolio formation methods, inclusion of 
post-IPO observations, and other filters employed on the data, and it is impossible to clearly 
identify the impact of each of those aspects on momentum profits from the extent literature.  
 Hence, in the second step, we conduct an empirical analysis of monthly data on 
Chinese A shares, with variations in one factor at a time (sample period, equally- or value-
weighed portfolios, skipping a period between portfolio formation and holding periods, and 
exclusion of post-IPO observations). This allows us to pinpoint directly how each of these 
factors affects momentum profits and why studies using different designs might have arrived 
at different conclusions. We find small stocks to exhibit stronger reversals than their larger 
counterparts, a large fraction of portfolio returns to be driven by returns in the first month 
after formation, and evidence of post-IPO price drifts. These findings allow us to better 
understand the drivers of momentum profits in China and thus explain the inconsistencies 
between finings reported in the literature on that topic. They tend to support the notion that 
price movements in the Chinese market, as many other markets, are not random in character 




Lastly, the time-varying nature of momentum profits documented here is also in line with the 
Adaptive Market Hypothesis by Lo (2004), which postulates that, as market conditions and 
investor cohort change over time, so will the extent of information utilisation by markets; the 
level of market efficiency will wax and wane over time, just as observed in this study. This 
implies that stock market investors should treat any historical patterns in data with caution, as 
any strategy designed to exploit those patterns may turn unprofitable when trends from the 
past cease to continue into the future.  
 Our work is limited to the extent that we have not attempted to understand the 
underlying causes of the effects we observe.  This is likely to be a major task given the 
extensive literature attempting to understand the causes of the momentum effect in the US 
and other developed markets.  There are numerous avenues for future investigation here 
including the effect on momentum/reversals of different market states, winning/losing stocks, 
market and macroeconomic risks, the properties of individual companies and the particular 
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Table A1: Average Returns of Momentum Strategies Based on Different Sample Periods and 




















1-1 -0.0078** 0.0022  -0.0174*** -0.0030  -0.0087** -0.0109*** 
 (-2.18) (0.47) (-3.32) (-0.69) (-2.47) (-3.03) 
1-2 -0.0094*** -0.0056  -0.0125*** -0.0064** -0.0099*** -0.0040  
 (-3.16) (-1.18) (-3.33) (-1.72) (-3.34) (-1.57) 
1-3 -0.0052** -0.0014  -0.0082** -0.0026  -0.0055** -0.0024  
 (-2.17) (-0.37) (-2.61) (-0.84) (-2.29) (-1.19) 
1-6 -0.0019  0.0004  -0.0038  -0.0012  -0.0020  -0.0004  
 (-1.24) (0.19) (-1.62) (-0.56) (-1.25) (-0.29) 
1-9 -0.0017  -0.0011  -0.0021  -0.0013  -0.0016  -0.0007  
 (-1.26) (-0.59) (-1.08) (-0.74) (-1.23) (-0.57) 
1-12 -0.0006  -0.0003  -0.0013  0.0006  -0.0006  -0.0002  
 (-0.56) (-0.17) (-0.67) (0.43) (-0.55) (-0.20) 
2-1 -0.0135*** -0.0086  -0.0179*** -0.0101** -0.0148*** -0.0060  
 (-3.17) (-1.26) (-3.32) (-1.98) (-3.44) (-1.60) 
2-2 -0.0094*** -0.0066  -0.0112** -0.0068  -0.0100*** -0.0016  
 (-2.62) (-1.12) (-2.48) (-1.53) (-2.75) (-0.50) 
2-3 -0.0054* -0.0024  -0.0075* -0.0026  -0.0057* -0.0018  
 (-1.77) (-0.52) (-1.79) (-0.68) (-1.86) (-0.68) 
3-1 -0.0097** -0.0035  -0.0145  -0.0056  -0.0099** -0.0036  
 (-2.25) (-0.53) (-2.57)** (-1.11) (-2.29) (-0.93) 
3-2 -0.0067* -0.0035  -0.0089* -0.0029  -0.0068* -0.0017  
 (-1.72) (-0.58) (-1.69) (-0.61) (-1.71) (-0.50) 
3-3 -0.0047  -0.0010  -0.0071  -0.0009  -0.0046  -0.0002  
 (-1.32) (-0.20) (-1.42) (-0.22) (-1.27) (-0.08) 
3-6 -0.0006  0.0019  -0.0023  0.0004  -0.0005  0.0009  
 (-0.25) (0.57) (-0.59) (0.14) (-0.21) (0.37) 
3-9 -0.0004  0.0001  -0.0009  0.0023  -0.0003  0.0013  
 (-0.17) (0.04) (-0.27) (0.88) (-0.13) (0.63) 
3-12 -0.0002  0.0001  -0.0003  0.0022  -0.0002  0.0001  
 (-0.08) (0.02) (-0.10) (0.91) (-0.10) (0.05) 
6-1 -0.0066  -0.0015  -0.0100  -0.0045  -0.0022  -0.0045  
 (-1.55) (-0.26) (-1.60) (-1.13) (-0.58) (-0.88) 
6-3 -0.0017  0.0021  -0.0041  -0.0025  -0.0015  0.0012  
 (-0.44) (0.39) (-0.72)  (-0.55) (-0.39) (0.34) 
6-6 0.0003  0.0012  -0.0004  0.0008  0.0005  0.0019  
 (0.09) (0.27) (-0.08) (0.20) (0.14) (0.58) 
6-9 0.0000  -0.0006  0.0005  0.0019  0.0001  0.0003  




6-12 -0.0011  -0.0023  -0.0013  0.0004  -0.0010  -0.0011  
 (-0.37) (-0.60) (-0.28) (0.14) (-0.36) (-0.40) 
9-1 -0.0073* -0.0052  -0.0090  -0.0048  -0.0090* -0.0023  
 (-1.69) (-0.82) (-1.40) (-0.95) (-1.66) (-0.56) 
9-3 -0.0021  -0.0009  -0.0034  -0.0001  -0.0020  0.0014  
 (-0.52) (-0.16) (-0.55) (-0.03) (-0.51) (0.36) 
9-6 -0.0009  -0.0018  -0.0003  0.0015  -0.0010  -0.0005  
 (-0.24) (-0.37) (-0.05) (0.36) (-0.26) (-0.15) 
9-9 -0.0021  -0.0047  -0.0019  0.0007  -0.0021  -0.0020  
 (-0.60) (-1.01) (-0.32) (-0.81) (-0.61) (-0.57) 
9-12 -0.0030  -0.0066  -0.0025  -0.0012  -0.0031  -0.0026  
 (-0.32) (-1.52) (-0.44) (-0.32) (-0.94) (-0.81) 
12-1 -0.0047  -0.0026  -0.0073  -0.0018  -0.0045  -0.0039  
 (-1.00) (-0.40) (-1.01) (-0.36) (-0.97) (-0.87) 
12-3 -0.0030  -0.0027  -0.0036  -0.0016  -0.0038  -0.0025  
 (-0.70) (-0.44) (-0.52) (-0.35) (-0.85) (-0.60) 
12-6 -0.0032  -0.0053  -0.0035  -0.0018  -0.0045  -0.0033  
 (-0.77) (-0.92) (-0.53) (-0.41) (-1.10) (-0.83) 
12-9 -0.0039  -0.0080  -0.0034  -0.0028  -0.0051  -0.0036  
 (-1.00) (-1.50) (-0.52) (-0.67) (-1.35) (-0.94) 
12-12 -0.0040  -0.0085  -0.0046  -0.0026  -0.0058  -0.0040  
 (-1.08) (-1.65) (-0.72) (-0.66) (-1.62) (-1.11) 
Note: Average momentum returns are computed using monthly data for the period January 1991 – December 
2012, unless indicated otherwise, using the approach of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), with J months of 
formation and K months of portfolio holding periods. Figures in parentheses are t-values. *, **, *** denotes 





Figure 1: An overview of momentum profits from equally-weighted 
portfolios.  
 
J/K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―






8 ̶― ̶― ̶―
9 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
10 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
11 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
12 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
13 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
14 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
15 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
16 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
17 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
18 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
19 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
20 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
21 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
22 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
23 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
24 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―  
Note: J denotes the formation and K the holding period length.  – (+) denotes significant 
negative (positive) returns.  
Figure 2: An overview of momentum profits from value-weighted 
portfolios. 
 















15 ̶― ̶― ̶―
16 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
17 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
18 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
19 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
20 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
21 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
22 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
23 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―
24 ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶― ̶―   




















































































































Other filters Core Findings Further findings 




















J, K=1, 2, 
4, 8, 12, 
16, 20, 26 
w 
S=1 day 
1 w Exclude 
stocks firstly 
listed in or 
after 1995 
EW: Sig. short-term 
contrarian  (1-1,  2-8, 2-16, 
4-4, 4-8, 4-12, 8-1, 8-2, 8-4, 
8-8, 8-12, 8-16, 12-4, 12-8 
weeks) 
Sig. medium-term 
momentum (12-26, 16-20, 
16-26, 20-16, 20-20, 20-26, 
26-12, 26-20, 26-26 weeks) 
VW: weaker sig. short-term 
contrarian than EW (1-1, 2-
16, 4-8, 8-1, 8-4, 8-8, 8-16, 
12-4, 12-8 weeks) 
 stronger sig. medium-term 
momentum (12-26, 16-20, 
16-26, 20-16, 20-20, 20-26, 
26-12, 26-16, 26-20, 26-26 
weeks) 
Results robust to skipping 
1 week except for 1-1 
strategy. 
Profits not due to 
differences in beta risk 
between winners and 
losers. 
overreaction to firm-
specific information is the 
single most important 
source of short-term 
contrarian profits;  
the negative cross-
































Insignificant profits for K=6, 
t-t+5 holding period; 
Sig. reversals for holding 
periods: t+6-t+11, t+12-
t+17, t+18-t+23, increase in 
magnitude over distance 




















9, 12, 18, 
24 m 
S=1 m 







Sig. medium- and long-term 
reversals (3-24, 6-18, 6-24, 
9-12, 9-18 , 9-24, 12-9, 12-
12, 12-18, 12-24, 18-3, 18-6, 
18-9, 18-12, 18-18, 18-24, 
24-3, 24-6, 24-9, 24-12, 24-
18, 24-24 months);  
Results not due to bid-ask 
spreads 
 
Results driven by more 
risky losers (small cap, 
high BM ratios) 




less than 12 
months of 







associated with average 
stock returns. 
No sig. results from test 
based on returns adjusted 


















































Reversals’ in 9-3, 9-6 high 
volume portfolio. 
Risk-adjusted returns (four 
factor model): momentum in 
3-3, 3-6, 3-9, 3-12 6-3, 6-9, 
6-12, 9-6, 9-9, 9-12, 12-3, 
12-6, 12-9, 12-12  low-
volume portfolios, 6-9, 6-12 
high-volume portfolios 
Risk-adjusted returns for 
SH only: momentum for 
low-volume portfolios for 
all J, K except J=K=12. 
Risk-adjusted returns for 
SZ only: momentum for 
low-volume portfolios for 
all J, K except J=K=3. 
Risk-adjusted returns for 
large stocks: momentum 
for low-volume portfolios 




























N/A N/A Sig. and clear pattern of 
momentum (all strategies 
were sig.);  
 
No strong links between 
past trading volume and 
momentum returns. 
 
Momentum returns decline 










































returns from industry 
momentum and 52-week 














































A shares: reversals for J=K= 
3, 12, 18, 24, 36); 
B shares: reversals for 
J=K=18, 24, 36; 
Pre-Feb2001: 
A shares: reversals for 
J=K=12, 18, 24, 36 m.  
B shares: reversals for 
J=K=12, 18, 24, 36 m. Sig. 
momentum profits for 
J=K=6m. 
Post-Feb2001: 
A shares: reversals for 
J=K=6, sig. momentum 
profits for J=K=18, 24, 36m. 
B shares: reversals for 
J=K=3, sig. momentum 
profits for J=K=9, 12, 18, 
24, 36m. 
For all trading horizons 
that yield significant 








Monthly SH, SZ 
jointly 
A 





N/A Stocks must 
have 36 
observations 





adjusted) returns: no sig. 
results; 
Using CAMP for risk-
adjustment: sig. short-term 
reversals (1-1, 1-3, 3-1, 3-3,  
6-1, 6-3, 9-1 m) 
 
Wu (2011) Dec.12, 





1991 to  
Dec.31, 
2001 

























“Little” evidences of pure 
momentum or contrarian 
profits:  
SH: Sig. contrarian (1w-1d, 
1w-1w, 3m-1d, 9m-1d, 12m-
1d), sig. momentum (1w-
9m, 1w-12m, 1m-12m, 3m-
9m, 3m-12m); 
SZ: 8 contrarian results (1w-
Combining mean reversion 
and momentum generates 
excess returns higher than 
those from both pure 
momentum and pure 
contrarian strategies. 
This result not fully driven 
by beta risk, bid-ask 




(SZ) 1w, 3m-1d, 3m-1w, 3m-1m, 
6m-1d, 9m-1d, 9m-1w, 12m-
1d)) 
or the number of 
portfolios. 




































2, 16, 24 w 
K=1,2,4,8,
12, 16 w 
S=0,1 
N/A S=0, 1 Monthly data: reversals (1-1, 
1-3, 3-1m); S=0 
Weekly data: reversals (1-1, 
1-8, 1-12, 1-16, 2-1, 2-8, 2-
12, 4-1, 4-2, 4-8, 4-12, 4-16, 
8-1, 8-2, 8-4, 8-8, 8-12, 12-
1,12-2, 12-4, 12-8, 16-1,16-
2,16-4, 24-1 ws); S=0 
 
Weekly data, S=1wk: 
fewer sig. reversals (2-16, 
4-2, 4-4, 4-8, 4-12, 4-16, 
all J=8, 12, 16, 24, K=1, 2, 
4, 8, 12, 16 ws). 
Momentum (1-1, 1-2 ws) 








































Monthly: reversals only (2-
1, 2-2) in the full sample;  
1995-2001: no significant 
profits; 
2002-2009 sig. short-term 
reversals (1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 
1-5, 2-1, 3-1).  
Weekly: sig. short-term 
reversals for whole sample 
period (1-1, 1-2, 2-1, 5-1, 6-
1, 7-1, 7-4, 7-5, 8-1, 8-2, 9-
1, 9-2, 10-1);  
1995-2001: one reversal (1-
1), more momentum (2-2, 2-
3, 3-2, 3-3 ws); 
2002-2009: more numerous 
reversals (J=1 to 10, K=1 to 
5, most for J+K<12). 
For interval ranking: 
significant numerous 
momentum in the whole 
sample and both 
subsamples, momentum 
profits up to 52 weeks of 
the holding period, 
strongest when formation 
period and holding periods 




























Sig. reversals in small stocks 
and momentum in large 
stocks. 
No substantial difference 
between CAR and BH 
returns; between USD and 
local currency returns; 














 Momentum stronger for 
VW portfolios, when focus 
is on more extreme 
winners/losers (more 
portfolios),  
Momentum weaker when 
log rather than simple 
returns used with the CAR 



























stocks with a 
share price 
below 








Full sample period (1995-
2013): Significant 
momentum except K=12 
EW and K=3 VW. 
Subsample 1995-2006: 
Stronger significant 
momentum for all K. 
Subsample 2007-2013: 
Significant reversals for all 
K except K=9, 12 VW. 
Jensen’s alphas from a 
three factor model: Full 
sample and subsample 
1995-2006: positive and 
significant, subsample 
2007-2013: all negative, 
significant except K=9, 12 
VW. 






















J, K=1, 3, 








Monthly data: insignificant 
profits; 
Weekly data: Significant 
momentum for 1-1 strategy, 
significant reversals for 1-3, 
2-2, 2-3, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3w. 
Weekly 2008-13 subperiod: 
Significant reversals except 
for 1-1 strategy. 
Sub-period 1994–2007: 
results not displayed but 
reported to be similar to 
those of whole sample 
period, with smaller 
contrarian profits. 
Sig. FF five factor model 
alphas for weekly 
strategies with significant 
mean profits.  
No significant returns 
using GH or BH methods 
(except sig. reversals for 





Note: “Exchange” specifies which of the two mainland Chinese stock markets, Shanghai Stock Exchange (SH) or Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZ), or both, were covered by each study. “Share 
type” refers to A- type or B-type shares. “JT (1993)” denotes the Jegadeesh and Titmann (1993) paper. “EV” (“VW”) indicates equally-weighted (value-weighted) portfolios. “Post-IPO 





Table 2: Average monthly momentum profits, equally-weighted portfolios. 
J/K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 -0.0125** -0.0111*** -0.0066*** -0.0048** -0.0039** -0.0026* -0.0015 -0.0021* -0.0005 -0.0016 -0.0012 -0.001
(-3.24) (-3.70) (-2.95) (-2.53) (-2.49) (-1.92) (-1.20) (-1.77) (-0.35) (-1.51) (-1.27) (-1.06)
2 -0.0151*** -0.0090*** -0.0058** -0.0043* -0.0032 -0.0015 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.001 -0.0005 -0.0008
(-3.53) (-2.76) (-2.07) (-1.79) (-1.60) (-0.80) (-0.66) (-0.72) (-0.70) (-0.71) (-0.36) (-0.57)
3 -0.0126*** -0.0075** -0.0047 -0.0033 -0.0017 -0.001 -0.0005 -0.001 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006
(-3.07) (-2.16) (-1.57) (-1.26) (-0.74) (-0.47) (-0.27) (-0.54) (-0.30) (-0.34) (-0.32) (-0.34)
4 -0.0104** -0.0061* -0.004 -0.0019 -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0008
(-2.53) (-1.75) (-1.31) (-0.71) (-0.36) (-0.08) (-0.09) (-0.16) (0.08) (-0.11) (-0.05) (-0.40)
5 -0.0083** -0.0057* -0.0024 -0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0008
(-2.16) (-1.68) (-0.78) (-0.39) (-0.20) (-0.18) (-0.15) (-0.08) (-0.16) (-0.12) (-0.40) (-0.37)
6 -0.0085** -0.0042 -0.002 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0016
(-2.23) (-1.24) (-0.61) (-0.25) (-0.26) (-0.16) (-0.04) (-0.25) (-0.19) (-0.49) (-0.44) (-0.68)
7 -0.0056 -0.0034 -0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0008 0.002 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0017 -0.0022
(-1.46) (-0.97) (-0.34) (-0.25) (-0.25) (0.54) (-0.23) (-0.27) (-0.50) (-0.48) (-0.64) (-0.84)
8 -0.0055 -0.0033 -0.0017 -0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0017 -0.0015 -0.0021 -0.0025 -0.0021
(-1.40) (-0.92) (-0.50) (-0.35) (-0.15) (-0.23) (-0.25) (-0.58) (-0.51) (-0.73) (-0.91) (-0.78)
9 -0.0054 -0.0033 -0.0016 -0.0006 -0.001 -0.0009 -0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0024 -0.0029 -0.0025 -0.0034
(-1.44) (-0.93) (-0.47) (-0.19) (-0.29) (-0.28) (-0.55) (-0.62) (-0.80) (-0.99) (-0.86) (-1.23)
10 -0.0055 -0.0036 -0.0017 -0.0018 -0.0015 -0.0023 -0.0022 -0.003 -0.0033 -0.0027 -0.0037 -0.0036
(-1.43) (-0.97) (-0.47) (-0.51) (-0.44) (-0.70) (-0.68) (-0.94) (-1.04) (-0.88) (-1.27) (-1.23)
11 -0.0057 -0.0032 -0.0027 -0.0022 -0.0031 -0.003 -0.0035 -0.0041 -0.0034 -0.0043 -0.0041 -0.0043
(-1.45) (-0.86) (-0.75) (-0.62) (-0.90) (-0.88) (-1.04) (-1.26) (-1.06) (-1.39) (-1.33) (-1.42)
12 -0.0047 -0.0045 -0.0032 -0.0038 -0.0035 -0.0038 -0.0042 -0.0037 -0.0046 -0.0043 -0.0044 -0.005
(-1.20) (-1.20) (-0.88) (-1.05) (-0.99) (-1.09) (-1.20) (-1.10) (-1.43) (-1.34) (-1.42) (-1.64)
13 -0.0076* -0.0056 -0.005 -0.0043 -0.0048 -0.0051 -0.0044 -0.0054 -0.0049 -0.0051 -0.0055* -0.0056*
(-1.94) (-1.46) (-1.35) (-1.18) (-1.35) (-1.43) (-1.26) (-1.61) (-1.50) (-1.57) (-1.74) (-1.78)
14 -0.0075* -0.0072* -0.0052 -0.0053 -0.0053 -0.0046 -0.0056 -0.0052 -0.0053 -0.0058* -0.0058* -0.0056*
(-1.90) (-1.88) (-1.38) (-1.41) (-1.43) (-1.29) (-1.60) (-1.51) (-1.56) (-1.76) (-1.77) (-1.73)
15 -0.0087** -0.0071* -0.0061 -0.006 -0.0049 -0.0056 -0.0053 -0.0055 -0.0060* -0.0060* -0.0056* -0.0057*
(-2.19) (-1.82) (-1.61) (-1.59) (-1.32) (-1.58) (-1.50) (-1.58) (-1.76) (-1.78) (-1.74) (-1.71)
16 -0.0085** -0.0078** -0.0070* -0.0056 -0.0062* -0.0055 -0.0057 -0.0064* -0.0059* -0.0060* -0.0058* -0.0065*
(-2.14) (-2.00) (-1.82) (-1.47) (-1.67) (-1.52) (-1.61) (-1.83) (-1.69) (-1.75) (-1.70) (-1.96)
17 -0.0099** -0.00890** -0.0054 -0.0066* -0.0059 -0.0058 -0.0066* -0.0066* -0.0062* -0.0059* -0.0067* -0.0069**
(-2.52) (-2.30) (-1.27) (-1.74) (-1.60) (-1.60) (-1.83) (-1.86) (-1.77) (-1.71) (-1.96) (-2.04)
18 -0.0108*** -0.0081** -0.0070* -0.0062 -0.0062 -0.0066* -0.0065* -0.0063* -0.0060* -0.0068* -0.0070** -0.0078**
(-2.61) (-2.06) (-1.80) (-1.64) (-1.65) (-1.79) (-1.77) (-1.74) (-1.68) (-1.92) (-1.99) (-2.28)
19 -0.0089** -0.0079** -0.0063 -0.0061 -0.0067* -0.0066* -0.0062* -0.0061 -0.0068* -0.0070* -0.0079** -0.0077**
(-2.18) (-1.99) (-1.62) (-1.60) (-1.78) (-1.76) (-1.68) (-1.65) (-1.88) (-1.95) (-2.25) (-2.21)
20 -0.0094** -0.0078* -0.0067* -0.0071* -0.0069* -0.0063* -0.0061 -0.0070* -0.0072* -0.0082** -0.0080** -0.0080**
(-2.29) (-1.95) (-1.70) (-1.85) (-1.80) (-1.65) (-1.61) (-1.88) (-1.96) (-2.26) (-2.22) (-2.23)
21 -0.0093** -0.0078* -0.0076* -0.0071* -0.0062 -0.006 -0.0069* -0.0073* -0.0082** -0.0080** -0.0081** -0.0079**
(-2.27) (-1.97) (-1.96) (-1.81) (-1.61) (-1.54) (-1.82) (-1.92) (-2.22) (-2.17) (-2.19) (-2.18)
22 -0.0094** -0.0090** -0.0079** -0.0067* -0.0063 -0.0071* -0.0074* -0.0085** -0.0083** -0.0083** -0.0081** -0.0080**
(-2.30) (-2.27) (-1.99) (-1.70) (-1.61) (-1.84) (-1.92) (-2.26) (-2.22) (-2.22) (-2.19) (-2.16)
23 -0.0113*** -0.0093** -0.0073** -0.0068* -0.0077* -0.0079** -0.0090** -0.0089** -0.0090** -0.0087** -0.0086** -0.0086**
(-2.69) (-2.29) (-1.83) (-1.71) (-1.97) (-2.02) (-2.35) (-2.34) (-2.35) (-2.30) (-2.26) (-2.28)
24 -0.0101** -0.0080** -0.0068* -0.0073** -0.0077* -0.0086** -0.0086** -0.0087** -0.0086** -0.0084** -0.0085** -0.0088**
(-2.45) (-1.99) (-1.70) (-1.85) (-1.93) (-2.22) (-2.20) (-2.25) (-2.21) (-2.17) (-2.19) (-2.26)




Table 2 continued 
J/K 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0016* -0.0014* -0.0017** -0.0016** -0.0014* -0.0014* -0.0013* -0.0014* -0.0016** -0.0016**
(-1.39) (-1.45) (-1.86) (-1.68) (-2.15) (-2.00) (-1.85) (-1.86) (-1.73) (-1.90) (-2.15) (-2.20)
2 -0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0017 -0.0018 -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0006 -0.0017 -0.0015
(-0.67) (-1.10) (-1.14) (-1.40) (-1.51) (-1.02) (-1.22) (-1.26) (-1.30) (-0.49) (-1.61) (-1.41)
3 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0016 -0.0018 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0017
(-0.74) (-0.69) (-1.02) (-1.17) (-1.02) (-1.00) (-1.02) (-1.13) (-1.31) (-1.40) (-1.29) (-1.24)
4 -0.001 -0.0014 -0.0018 -0.0013 -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.002 -0.002 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0021
(-0.50) (-0.75) (-0.97) (-0.74) (-1.00) (-0.93) (-0.99) (-1.19) (-1.22) (-1.14) (-1.11) (-1.33)
5 -0.0014 -0.0018 -0.0015 -0.0021 -0.002 -0.002 -0.0023 -0.0024 -0.0022 -0.0021 -0.0025 -0.0026
(-0.67) (-0.86) (-0.72) (-1.07) (-1.02) (-1.03) (-1.24) (-1.30) (-1.18) (-1.15) (-1.42) (-1.47)
6 -0.0021 -0.0017 -0.0024 -0.0023 -0.0025 -0.0027 -0.0028 -0.0026 -0.0025 -0.0029 -0.003 -0.0034*
(-0.90) (-0.77) (-1.08) (-1.08) (-1.15) (-1.30) (-1.34) (-1.26) (-1.21) (-1.47) (-1.53) (-1.75)
7 -0.0018 -0.0026 -0.0025 -0.0027 -0.0031 -0.003 -0.0028 -0.0027 -0.0032 -0.0033 -0.0038* -0.0036*
(-0.71) (-1.08) (-1.08) (-1.17) (-1.36) (-1.33) (-1.27) (-1.23) (-1.50) (-1.55) (-1.82) (-1.74)
8 -0.003 -0.003 -0.0031 -0.0037 -0.0018 -0.0033 -0.0032 -0.0037 -0.0038 -0.0043* -0.0041* -0.0041*
(-1.15) (-1.16) (-1.25) (-1.48) (-0.67) (-1.39) (-1.33) (-1.61) (-1.64) (-1.90) (-1.85) (-1.86)
9 -0.0033 -0.0035 -0.0041 -0.0041 -0.0039 -0.0036 -0.0041* -0.0042* -0.0048** -0.0045* -0.0046* -0.0043*
(-1.24) (-1.32) (-1.55) (-1.59) (-1.51) (-1.41) (-1.68) (-1.74) (-2.00) (-1.93) (-1.96) (-1.89)
10 -0.0038 -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0042 -0.0039 -0.0044* -0.005* -0.0052** -0.0049* -0.0049** -0.003 -0.0045*
(-1.34) (-1.57) (-1.60) (-1.55) (-1.47) (-1.71) (-1.77) (-2.05) (-1.97) (-1.99) (-1.11) (-1.89)
11 -0.0049* -0.0050* -0.0048* -0.0046 -0.0051* -0.0051* -0.0057** -0.0055** -0.0054** -0.0051** -0.0050* -0.0049*
(-1.67) (-1.72) (-1.68) (-1.61) (-1.86) (-1.87) (-2.12) (-2.08) (-2.07) (-1.99) (-1.96) (-1.95)
12 -0.0052* -0.0051* -0.0049 -0.0055* -0.0055* -0.0060** -0.0057** -0.0057** -0.0054** -0.0052* -0.0052* -0.0054**
(-1.72) (-1.69) (-1.63) (-1.90) (-1.93) (-2.14) (-2.08) (-2.08) (-2.01) (-1.96) (-1.96) (-2.04)
13 -0.0055* -0.0053* -0.0060** -0.0061** -0.0066** -0.0063** -0.0062** -0.0060** -0.0058** -0.0057** -0.0060** -0.0059**
(-1.78) (-1.74) (-2.01) (-2.06) (-2.30) (-2.21) (-2.20) (-2.16) (-2.10) (-2.08) (-2.17) (-2.16)
14 -0.0056* -0.0063** -0.0064** -0.0070** -0.0067** -0.0065** -0.0063** -0.0061** -0.0061** -0.0063** -0.0062** -0.0060**
(-1.74) (-2.02) (-2.08) (-2.33) (-2.24) (-2.20) (-2.16) (-2.13) (-2.11) (-2.19) (-2.17) (-2.11)
15 -0.0064** -0.0066** -0.0073** -0.0070** -0.0068** -0.0065** -0.0049 -0.0064** -0.0065** -0.0064** -0.0063** -0.0064**
(-2.01) (-2.07) (-2.34) (-2.26) (-2.23) (-2.17) (-1.52) (-2.14) (-2.19) (-2.17) (-2.13) (-2.20)
16 -0.0068** -0.0075** -0.0073** -0.0071** -0.0068** -0.0066** -0.0066** -0.0068** -0.0067** -0.0065** -0.0067** -0.0068**
(-2.05) (-2.33) (-2.27) (-2.26) (-2.19) (-2.12) (-2.14) (-2.23) (-2.20) (-2.15) (-2.23) (-2.26)
17 -0.0077** -0.0075** -0.00739** -0.0071** -0.0069** -0.0068** -0.0070** -0.0069** -0.0068** -0.0069** -0.0070** -0.0065**
(-2.34) (-2.28) (-2.27) (-2.21) (-2.15) (-2.14) (-2.22) (-2.21) (-2.15) (-2.21) (-2.24) (-2.13)
18 -0.0077** -0.0076** -0.0074** -0.0072** -0.0071** -0.0073** -0.0072** -0.0071** -0.0072** -0.0072** -0.0069** -0.0069**
(-2.27) (-2.27) (-2.21) (-2.16) (-2.15) (-2.21) (-2.20) (-2.18) (-2.22) (-2.25) (-2.15) (-2.21)
19 -0.0078** -0.0076** -0.0075** -0.0074** -0.0076** -0.0074** -0.0073** -0.0075** -0.0075** -0.0071** -0.0072** -0.0071**
(-2.26) (-2.22) (-2.18) (-2.17) (-2.24) (-2.20) (-2.18) (-2.24) (-2.27) (-2.16) (-2.22) (-2.18)
20 -0.0079** -0.0078** -0.0077** -0.0079** -0.0078** -0.0076** -0.0078** -0.0079** -0.0074** -0.0075** -0.0073** -0.0060*
-2.24 (-2.22) (-2.20) (-2.25) (-2.23) (-2.19) (-2.26) (-2.31) (-2.17) (-2.23) (-2.19) (-1.93)
21 -0.0079** -0.0080** -0.0081** -0.0081** -0.0079** -0.0081** -0.0081** -0.0076** -0.0077** -0.0076** -0.0062* -0.0063*
(-2.18) (-2.20) (-2.25) (-2.23) (-2.20) (-2.26) (-2.28) (-2.17) (-2.21) (-2.18) (-1.92) (-1.97)
22 -0.0082** -0.0085** -0.0084** -0.0083** -0.0085 -0.0085** -0.0079* -0.0080** -0.0078** -0.0064* -0.0065** -0.0064**
(-2.21) (-2.28) (-2.27) (-2.25) (-2.30) (-2.32) (-2.19) (-2.23) (-2.19) (-1.94) (-1.99) (-1.99)
23 -0.0090** -0.0089** -0.0088** -0.0090** -0.0091** -0.0083** -0.0084** -0.0083** -0.0067** -0.0068** -0.0067** -0.0053*
(-2.38) (-2.36) (-2.33) (-2.39) (-2.42) (-2.26) (-2.29) (-2.26) (-2.00) (-2.05) (-2.03) (-1.76)
24 -0.0089** -0.0088** -0.0090** -0.0091** -0.0085** -0.0085** -0.0083** -0.0068* -0.0069** -0.0068** -0.0054** -0.005
(-2.29) (-2.27) (-2.33) (-2.36) (-2.23) (-2.25) (-2.21) (-1.96) (-2.01) (-2.01) (-1.74) (-1.63)
 Note: Average momentum returns are computed using monthly data for the period January 1991 – December 2012 using the 
approach of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), with J months of formation and K months of portfolio holding periods. Figures in 





Table 3: Average monthly momentum profits, value-weighted portfolios. 
J/K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 -0.0103** -0.0086** -0.004 -0.0026 -0.0025 -0.0015 -0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0006
(-2.20) (-2.51) (-1.49) (-1.10) (-1.24) (-0.89) (-0.30) (-0.74) (-0.35) (-0.14) (0.27) (0.49)
2 -0.0112** -0.006 -0.0027 -0.0021 -0.0019 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0006 0.0011 0.0017 0.0012
(-2.35) (-1.56) (-0.82) (-0.70) (-0.77) (-0.47) (-0.22) (-0.08) (0.31) (0.61) (1.02) (0.75)
3 -0.0085* -0.0035 -0.0013 -0.0007 0.0000 0.0003 0.0013 0.0015 0.0025 0.0025 0.0024 0.0019
(-1.84) (-0.86) (-0.36) (-0.24) (0.01) (0.12) (0.50) (0.62) (1.07) (1.15) (1.16) (0.94)
4 -0.0054 -0.0029 -0.0023 -0.0009 -0.0002 0.0007 0.0013 0.0018 0.0028 0.0024 0.0022 0.0012
(-1.13) (-0.68) (-0.63) (-0.28) (-0.07) (0.24) (0.48) (0.69) (1.08) (0.95) (0.90) (0.50)
5 -0.0033 -0.0031 -0.0012 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0012 0.0016 0.0024 0.0024 0.0024 0.0017 0.0016
(-0.72) (-0.78) (-0.35) (-0.04) (0.17) (0.37) (0.54) (0.84) (0.84) (0.87) (0.67) (0.61)
6 -0.0066 -0.0036 -0.0017 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0011 0.0017 0.0017 0.002 0.0014 0.0015 0.0005
(-1.50) (-0.93) (-0.45) (-0.05) (0.09) (0.31) (0.52) (0.52) (0.64) (0.47) (0.53) (0.19)
7 -0.004 -0.0027 -0.0004 0.0007 0.0009 0.002 0.0019 0.0022 0.0017 0.0019 0.0014 0.0004
(-0.90) (-0.64) (-0.11) (0.17) (0.24) (0.54) (0.54) (0.64) (0.52) (0.60) (0.46) (0.15)
8 -0.0029 -0.0017 0.0000 0.0012 0.0021 0.0019 0.0021 0.0016 0.0019 0.0012 0.0004 0.0006
(-0.64) (-0.39) (0.00) (0.31) (0.54) (0.50) (0.59) (0.47) (0.58) (0.37) (0.14) (0.19)
9 -0.002 -0.0003 0.0013 0.0025 0.0021 0.0019 0.0016 0.0017 0.0011 0.0004 0.0006 -0.0006
(-0.46) (-0.07) (0.31) (0.63) (0.55) (0.52) (0.45) (0.49) (0.33) (0.11) (0.18) (-0.18)
10 0.0000 0.001 0.0024 0.0021 0.0019 0.0013 0.0014 0.0005 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0011
(-0.01) (0.23) (0.60) (0.53) (0.50) (0.35) (0.38) (0.13) (0.01) (0.12) (-0.21) (-0.33)
11 -0.0012 0.0007 0.0004 0.0007 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0015
(-0.27) (0.17) (0.11) (0.18) (0.08) (0.06) (-0.13) (-0.31) (-0.14) (-0.35) (-0.38) (-0.46)
12 -0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.0015 -0.001 -0.0017 -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0022
(-0.08) (-0.31) (-0.16) (-0.12) (-0.03) (-0.26) (-0.39) (-0.27) (-0.47) (-0.41) (-0.46) (-0.65)
13 -0.0043 -0.0029 -0.002 -0.0011 -0.0018 -0.0024 -0.0019 -0.0025 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0026 -0.0029
(-0.98) (-0.70) (-0.50) (-0.27) (-0.46) (-0.62) (-0.49) (-0.69) (-0.60) (-0.62) (-0.74) (-0.85)
14 -0.0035 -0.0034 -0.002 -0.0023 -0.0024 -0.0021 -0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0024 -0.0028 -0.0029 -0.003
(-0.81) (-0.81) (-0.49) (-0.55) (-0.60) (-0.54) (-0.72) (-0.69) (-0.65) (-0.78) (-0.82) (-0.84)
15 -0.0044 -0.0039 -0.004 -0.0039 -0.0029 -0.0034 -0.8131 -0.793 -0.8833 -0.9334 -0.9133 -0.9434
(-0.98) (-0.91) (-0.95) (-0.94) (-0.72) (-0.82) (-0.81) (-0.79) (-0.88) (-0.93) (-0.91) (-0.94)
16 -0.0055 -0.0057 -0.0056 -0.0043 -0.0047 -0.004 -0.0039 -0.0042 -0.0041 -0.0037 -0.0037 -0.0046
(-1.23) (-1.35) (-1.33) (-1.04) (-1.16) (-1.00) (-0.99) (-1.10) (-1.08) (-1.00) (-1.00) (-1.31)
17 -0.0074 -0.0074* -0.0054 -0.005 -0.0045 -0.0043 -0.0045 -0.0045 -0.0041 -0.0038 -0.0047 -0.0051
(-1.65) (-1.70) (-1.27) (-1.20) (-1.10) (-1.06) (-1.14) (-1.16) (-1.06) (-1.00) (-1.28) (-1.40)
18 -0.0089* -0.0062 -0.0053 -0.0046 -0.0046 -0.0045 -0.0044 -0.0043 -0.0039 -0.0047 -0.005 -0.0059
(-1.89) (-1.42) (-1.24) (-1.10) (-1.11) (-1.12) (-1.11) (-1.09) (-1.01) (-1.25) (-1.34) (-1.61)
19 -0.0072 -0.0059 -0.0048 -0.0047 -0.005 -0.0047 -0.0043 -0.004 -0.0047 -0.005 -0.0059 -0.0058
(-1.57) (-1.35) (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.22) (-1.16) (-1.07) (-1.01) (-1.21) (-1.29) (-1.55) (-1.54)
20 -0.0067 -0.006 -0.0051 -0.0053 -0.0052 -0.0043 -0.0041 -0.0048 -0.005 -0.0059 -0.0058 -0.0059
(-1.49) (-1.38) (-1.18) (-1.25) (-1.24) (-1.04) (-0.99) (-1.18) (-1.24) (-1.48) (-1.47) (-1.50)
21 -0.0059 -0.0053 -0.0052 -0.005 -0.0041 -0.0039 -0.0049 -0.0051 -0.0061 -0.0059 -0.006 -0.0058
(-1.31) (-1.19) (-1.18) (-1.15) (-0.96) (-0.91) (-1.17) (-1.23) (-1.48) (-1.43) (-1.46) (-1.43)
22 -0.0065 -0.0062 -0.0057 -0.0044 -0.0041 -0.0049 -0.0052 -0.0064 -0.0062 -0.0061 -0.0058 -0.0058
(-1.43) (-1.39) (-1.29) (-1.01) (-0.93) (-1.15) (-1.24) (-1.53) (-1.49) (-1.47) (-1.41) (-1.43)
23 -0.0077 -0.0065 -0.0047 -0.004 -0.0051 -0.0053 -0.0065 -0.0065 -0.0065 -0.0061 -0.0061 -0.0063
(-1.63) (-1.44) (-1.05) (-0.89) (-1.16) (-1.23) (-1.53) (-1.53) (-1.54) (-1.46) (-1.45) (-1.51)
24 -0.0071 -0.005 -0.0043 -0.005 -0.0053 -0.0064 -0.0065 -0.0066 -0.0063 -0.0061 -0.0063 -0.007
(-1.59) (-1.14) (-0.97) (-1.13) (-1.20) (-1.49) (-1.51) (-1.53) (-1.47) (-1.43) (-1.47) (-1.63)




J/K 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0009
(-0.01) (-0.05) (-0.49) (-0.28) (-0.93) (-0.73) (-0.43) (-0.51) (-0.62) (-0.67) (-0.87) (-0.98)
2 0.0008 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0007
(-0.48) (-0.13) (-0.10) (-0.28) (-0.48) (-0.10) (-0.25) (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.49) (-0.62) (-0.56)
3 -0.0012 0.001 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0005
(-0.74) (-0.53) (-0.15) (-0.05) (-0.12) (-0.13) (-0.03) (-0.08) (-0.17) (-0.25) (-0.26) (-0.32)
4 0.0007 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0014
(-0.33) (-0.06) (-0.23) (-0.06) (-0.27) (-0.26) (-0.28) (-0.41) (-0.43) (-0.39) (-0.45) (-0.75)
5 0.0007 -0.0018 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.001 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0015 -0.0016
(-0.27) (-0.86) (-0.10) (-0.24) (-0.32) (-0.27) (-0.40) (-0.46) (-0.40) (-0.39) (-0.73) (-0.78)
6 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0019 -0.0021 -0.0025
(-0.14) (-0.06) (-0.33) (-0.47) (-0.53) (-0.60) (-0.61) (-0.60) (-0.55) (-0.85) (-0.92) (-1.14)
7 0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0025 -0.0024
(-0.24) (-0.12) (-0.24) (-0.35) (-0.51) (-0.50) (-0.47) (-0.44) (-0.72) (-0.74) (-1.02) (-0.99)
8 -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0027 -0.0041 -0.0028
(-0.19) (-0.30) (-0.40) (-0.63) (-0.67) (-0.55) (-0.49) (-0.80) (-0.83) (-1.09) (-1.86) (-1.12)
9 -0.001 -0.0013 -0.002 -0.0022 -0.002 -0.0017 -0.0024 -0.0025 -0.0031 -0.0029 -0.003 -0.0028
(-0.32) (-0.43) (-0.66) (-0.76) (-0.69) (-0.61) (-0.88) (-0.93) (-1.16) (-1.11) (-1.15) (-1.10)
10 -0.0014 -0.002 -0.0023 -0.0021 -0.002 -0.0027 -0.0028 -0.0034 -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.003 -0.003
(-0.46) (-0.66) (-0.74) (-0.71) (-0.66) (-0.93) (-1.00) (-1.24) (-1.17) (-1.18) (-1.11) (-1.11)
11 -0.0022 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0024 -0.0032 -0.0031 -0.0039 -0.0037 -0.0036 -0.0033 -0.0033 -0.0033
(-0.68) (-0.78) (-0.79) (-0.77) (-1.05) (-1.05) (-1.32) (-1.28) (-1.26) (-1.18) (-1.17) (-1.20)
12 -0.0026 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0035 -0.0036 -0.0041 -0.0039 -0.0039 -0.0036 -0.0035 -0.0036 -0.0039
(-0.77) (-0.77) (-0.78) (-1.12) (-1.15) (-1.34) (-1.30) (-1.30) (-1.20) (-1.19) (-1.20) (-1.33)
13 -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0041 -0.0043 -0.005 -0.0047 -0.0046 -0.0043 -0.0043 -0.0042 -0.0046 -0.0047
(-0.91) (-0.93) (-1.27) (-1.36) (-1.59) (-1.52) (-1.51) (-1.43) (-1.41) (-1.40) (-1.52) (-1.57)
14 -0.0032 -0.0042 -0.0045 -0.0053 -0.005 -0.0048 -0.0045 -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0047 -0.0049 -0.0049
(-0.91) (-1.26) (-1.35) (-1.61) (-1.55) (-1.51) (-1.42) (-1.40) (-1.41) (-1.52) (-1.56) (-1.58)
15 -0.0045 -0.0048 -0.0057* -0.0057* -0.0054 -0.005 -0.0049 -0.0049 -0.0052 -0.0053 -0.0053 -0.0055*
(-1.29) (-1.41) (-1.68) (-1.68) (-1.62) (-1.54) (-1.52) (-1.52) (-1.61) (-1.64) (-1.65) (-1.74)
16 -0.0051 -0.0061* -0.0059* -0.0059* -0.0054 -0.0052 -0.0053 -0.0056* -0.0056* -0.0056* -0.0058* -0.0061*
(-1.44) (-1.75) (-1.72) (-1.73) (-1.61) (-1.57) (-1.58) (-1.69) (-1.71) (-1.69) (-1.77) (-1.86)
17 -0.0060* -0.0060* -0.0059* -0.0055 -0.0054 -0.0053 -0.0056 -0.0057* -0.0056 -0.0057* -0.0060* -0.0057*
(-1.69) (-1.69) (-1.68) (-1.60) (-1.56) (-1.55) (-1.63) (-1.68) (-1.65) (-1.69) (-1.76) (-1.69)
18 -0.006 -0.006 -0.0057 -0.0057 -0.0056 -0.0059* -0.0060* -0.0060* -0.0060* -0.0062* -0.0060* -0.0060*
(-1.63) (-1.64) (-1.60) (-1.60) (-1.58) (-1.66) (-1.69) (-1.69) (-1.73) (-1.78) (-1.72) (-1.76)
19 -0.0061 -0.0059 -0.0059 -0.0059 -0.0062* -0.0062* -0.0062* -0.0064* -0.0065* -0.0061* -0.0062* -0.0061*
(-1.61) (-1.59) (-1.59) (-1.61) (-1.69) (-1.70) (-1.70) (-1.75) (-1.80) (-1.70) (-1.72) (-1.72)
20 -0.0058 -0.0059 -0.0059 -0.0063 -0.0063* -0.0063 -0.0064* -0.0066* -0.0061 -0.0062* -0.0062* -0.005
(-1.50) (-1.53) (-1.53) (-1.64) (-1.66) (-1.64) (-1.68) (-1.75) (-1.63) (-1.65) (-1.66) (-1.43)
21 -0.0059 -0.0061 -0.0065 -0.0066* -0.0066* -0.0067* -0.0069* -0.0064* -0.0064* -0.0065* -0.0053 -0.0053
(-1.47) (-1.52) (-1.63) (-1.67) (-1.66) (-1.70) (-1.76) (-1.65) (-1.66) (-1.68) (-1.44) (-1.46)
22 -0.0062 -0.0068* -0.0070* -0.0071* -0.0072* -0.0073* -0.0066* -0.0067* -0.0067* -0.0054 -0.0055 -0.0057
(-1.52) (-1.67) (-1.73) (-1.76) (-1.79) (-1.83) (-1.70) (-1.70) (-1.70) (-1.46) (-1.48) (-1.53)
23 -0.0069* -0.0072* -0.0073* -0.0076* -0.0078* -0.0070* -0.0070* -0.0071* -0.0057 -0.0057 -0.0057 -0.0047
(-1.66) (-1.74) (-1.77) (-1.83) (-1.88) (-1.73) (-1.71) (-1.74) (-1.48) (-1.48) (-1.50) (-1.28)
24 -0.0074* -0.0076* -0.0078 -0.0080* -0.0073* -0.0071* -0.0072* -0.0058 -0.0058 -0.0059 -0.0048 -0.0044
(-1.73) (-1.78) (-1.84) (-1.89) (-1.75) (-1.72) (-1.73) (-1.47) (-1.47) (-1.51) (-1.28) (-1.20)
 Note: Average momentum returns are computed using monthly data for the period January 1991 – December 2012 
using the approach of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), with J months of formation and K months of portfolio holding 
periods. Figures in parentheses are t-values. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively 
